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THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
TO AIRCRAFT HIJACKING
Gary N. Horlick *
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first recorded incident of aircraft hijacking' took place in Peru
in 1930,2 27 years after the first heavier-than-air flight.' While the
emergence of hijacking as a frequent occurrence began during the Cold
War years following World War II,1 the "modem" era of hijacking
may be dated from May 1, 1961, when an armed Cuban calling
himself "Elpirata Cofrisi," the name of an 18th century Spanish
* B.A., 1970, Cambridge University; J.D., 1973, Yale University.
1. The term "hijacking" is used throughout this article to describe the
unlawful seizure, by force or threat thereof, of aircraft. However, the term
"aircraft piracy" also has been used in reference to precisely the same
phenomenon. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (the United States hijacking statute).
The term "unlawful seizure (or diversion) of aircraft" is apparently preferred
internationally, possibly for purity of translation. Cf. 65 PROC. AM. Soc,Y
INT'L L. 95 (1971). For an excellent bibliography on hijacking see 26 RECORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 325 (1971).
The analogy between hijacking and piracy ]ure gentium has often been
suggested; however, the definition of piracy by the Geneva Convention of 1958 is,
strictly speaking, inapplicable to aircraft hijacking. See Horlick, The Developing
Law of Air Hijacking, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 33, 64-67 (1970); Johnson &
Valladao, 54 INT'L L. Assoc. REP. 731-49 (1970); Shubber, Is Hijacking of
Aircraft Piracy in International Law?, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 193, 199-202
(1968-69); Valladao, Pirateria aerienne: nouveau delit international, 32 REV.
GENERALE DE L'AIR ET DE L'EsPACE 261, 268 (1969); Van Panhuys,
Aircraft Hijacking and InternationalLaw, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4-12
(1970); Wurfel, Aircraft Piracy-Crime or Fun?, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 820,
840-43 (1969).
2. List of hijackings supplied by the Federal Aviation Administration
[hereinafter cited as FAA List]. Coincidentally, the pilot of the plane hijacked in
1930 was also the pilot of the first jet to be hijacked, in 1961. J. AREY, THE
SKY PIRATES 57 (1972). Mr. Arey is an employee of Pan American World
Airways.
3. The need for an examination of the legal problems of piracy in
international airspace was first pointed out in 1957. See Johnson, Piracy in
Modern InternationalLaw, 43 TRANSACTIONS GROT. Soc'Y 63, 67 & n.6
(1957).
4. One hijacking occurred in 1947, seven in 1948, three in 1949 and three in
1950. FAA List, supra note 2.
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pirate, ordered the pilot of a National Airlines Convair 440 carrying
eight passengers to divert from his Marathon-to-Key West flight plan
and land in Havana.' As of January 1, 1972, there had been a total of
328 hijacking incidents, of which 226 were successful (91 United
States aircraft, 135 foreign aircraft) and 102 unsuccessful (37 United
States aircraft, 65 foreign aircraft).6 In 1972 alone, as of November
10, 30 airliners from 14 countries had been hijacked and 29 other
hijacking attempts had been made. 7
Hijacking statistics show a significant rise in number and increased
geographical spread in the years since 1966; instead of a few
unscheduled flights to Havana, there are now numerous hijackings
occurring throughout the world. Prior to 1967 there had been 40
successful hijackings-8 to Cuba and 32 elsewhere. During 1967, there
were 3 to Cuba, 3 elsewhere; during 1968, 27 to Cuba, 3 elsewhere; in
1969, 58 to Cuba, 12 elsewhere; in 1970, 32 to Cuba, 24 elsewhere;
and in 1971, 14 to Cuba, 10 elsewhere.'
Moreover, the 58
incidents-successful and unsuccessful-in 1971 involved 105 hijackers
of at least 22 different nationalities, and 36 air carriers of 24 states.'
The number of persons directly affected by hijackings has also
increased dramatically in recent years. The five hijackings in 1961 for
which figures are available affected 178 passengers in addition to the
crew members, while the 27 documented successful seizures in 1968
involved 1,490 passengers (including the 43 hijackers) and 168 crew
members--an incidence of 5.7 hijacked passengers per million air
travelers in 1968.0 It is safe to double these figures for the 70
successful hijackings in 1969 and the 56 successes in 1970. These
figures, of course, do not reflect the inconvenience to and emotional
impact on the many passengers of aircraft subjected to unsuccessful
5. Hearings on Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area Before the Subcomm. on
Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9, 19 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CaribbeanHearings]. See also The Times
(London), May 3, 1961, at 11, col. 1.
6. FAA List, supra note 2.
7. Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1972, § A, at 24, col. 1.
8. In 1967, the recipient countries other than Cuba were Algeria, Jordan and
Nigeria; in 1968, Algeria, Egypt and the Philippines; in 1969, Egypt, Zaire, Sudan,
Albania, Syria, Aden, Bulgaria, West Germany, Italy, Austria and North Korea; in
1970, Lebanon, North Korea, Austria, Egypt, Denmark, West Germany, Syria,
Yugoslavia, Jordan, North Vietnam, Iraq and Turkey; and in 1971, Libya,
Pakistan, Canada, China, Venezuela, Austria, the Bahamas, Congo (Brazzaville)
and Peru. FAA List, supra note 2.
9. FAA List, supra note 2.
10. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doe. AT-WP/1005 at 5,
7, 17 (1969).
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attempts, or the additional hazards experienced by the 21 Israelis held
in Algeria in 1968,11 the two Israelis detained in Syria for three
months in 1969,12 the 310 passengers and crew members held as
hostages in September, 1970, by Palestinian guerrillas for the release
of Arabs held in Switzerland, West Germany and England, 3 and the
fourteen crew members held in Aden by14another guerrilla group in
1972 for a payment of five million dollars.
II.

THE HIJACKERS

The interests of aircraft hijackers are not easily summarized, if for
no other reason than that the motivation of a given incident often
cannot be clearly defined. For example, the recent extortion hijackings
could have been motivated as easily by a desire for notoriety or other
psychological reward as by a desire for cash. Hijackers exhibit,
however, several recurring motivations. One fairly consistent element
is the desire of the hijacker to escape the country in which he lives.
Clearly, this motive was present in the eighteen attempts (eleven
successes, seven failures) to flee Eastern European countries since
1960 by hijackers having no other legal means of departure. Hijackings
to Cuba by military deserters, Black Panthers and other fugitives from
justice may have been similarly motivated. Of 49 hijackers traced by
the Justice Department by 1969, fourteen had prior criminal records,
and four were currently being sought on charges ranging from passing
a bad check to the attempted murder of a policeman."5
Personal problems probably underlie most of the attempted
hijackings. An example is the Army deserter who fled to Cuba with his
daughter, whose custody had just been awarded to his ex-wife. Often,
however, these hijackings can be viewed as political in the broadest
sense-i.e. an expression of the hijacker's discontent with his life in
the departed country. An American psychiatrist has claimed that most
of the hijackers he has interviewed exhibited suicidal personalities and
a strong need to attract the attention of the entire world to their

11. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
12. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
13. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 8, 1969, at 22.
14. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
15. FAA List, supra note 2. See also Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and
Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 700 & n.25 (1969); HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, AIRCRAFT PIRACY, H.R. REP.
No. 33, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1969) [hereinafter cited as AIRCRAFT
PIRACY REPORT].
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plight. 6 Additionally, there is a certain contagious quality about a
successful hijacking covered extensively by the media. Perhaps this
explains why extortion hijackings seem to occur in waves or cycles.' 7
In addition to hijackings for reasons of escape, personal discontent
or notoriety, a number of hijackings have been undertaken as part of a
political plan either to extort some advantage in bargaining power or
to call attention to a political issue. The former category clearly would
include those hijackings designed to take hostages."8 The 1969
hijacking to Syria to protest the sale of U.S. Phantom jets to Israel
falls more clearly into the category of political "demonstration," even
though six Israelis were detained for various lengths of time. 9 In
addition, the flights to China and North Korea by radical students
certainly involve an element of "demonstration." Finally, many of the
16. Evans, supra note 15, at 700; D. HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER (1971).
17. "[O] ur feeling is that this is a communicable disease. One fellow reading
about a hijacking, the way that another fellow has apparently solved this problem
by getting out of the United States by doing so in a quite splashy manner, that
does plant a seed in that man's mind.... That is the best explanation we have for
this cyclical nature of the problem." Hearings on Aviation Safety and Aircraft
Piracy Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 55 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Aviation Safety Hearings]
(quoting Frank E. Loy, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Transportation and Telecommunications, Dep't of State).
18. Examples include the following incidents: the 1968 diversion of an El Al
flight to Algiers, FAA List, supra note 2, no. 81; the July 22, 1970 hijacking of
an Olympic Beirut-to-Athens flight to force the release of Arab guerrillas held in
Greece for their attacks on El Al planes and offices, FAA List, supra note 2, no.
233; the five hijackings in September, 1970 by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), FAA List, supra note 2, nos. 247-51; the
attempted seizure of a Rio de Janeiro-Buenos Aires flight by four Brazilians to
exchange the passengers for jailed terrorists, FAA List, supra note 2, no. 229;
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1970, at 70, col. 6; and the hijacking of the Lufthansa jet
ransomed from Aden, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
19. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1969, at 1, col. 8, and 2, col. 3. Also within this
category are the following incidents: the forced return to Paris of a Paris-Athens
flight while antijunta pamphlets were distributed to the passengers, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 9, 1968, at 3, col. 6; the 1930 hijacking and two in late 1961 to scatter
propaganda leaflets over Peru, Portugal and Venezuela, respectively, J. AREY,
supra note 2, at 49, 64; the two unsuccessful attempts by the PFLP on Jordanian
planes while King Hussein was suppressing the guerrillas in 1971, N.Y. Times, Dec.
26, 1971, at 46, col. 5; the 1971 seizure and destruction of an Indian plane by
Kashmiris in Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1971, at 3, col. 5; and the surrender of
a hijacker in Los Angeles only after he was interviewed on live radio and television
about the injustices suffered by poor minority groups, N.Y. Times, April 14,
1972, at 11, col. 2.
Vol. 6-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W

hijackings to Cuba from the United States and Latin America may
have some element of "demonstration," although they are predominately for "escape" or personal reasons.
Hijackings solely for extortion became popular in late 1971. The
fictitious "D.B. Cooper" became a minor folk hero when he
successfully parachuted from a Northwest Orient jet on Thanksgiving
Eve with 200,000 dollars ransom money.2 Five of the six attempted
American hijackings in January, 1972, were for extortion (all five
were thwarted),2 1 and March, 1972, was marked by the use of bomb
threats for extortion, patterned after the example of the hoaxer who
persuaded Quantas officials in Australia to pay over 560,000 dollars in
May, 1971.
Ill.

THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS OF HIJACKING

A. Direct and Indirect Dangers

1. Direct Dangers.-In addition to the attendant irritation, inconvenience and delay, hijackings are extremely dangerous. To date,
hijacking deaths on U.S.-registered planes have included two passengers, one copilot,2 2 one boarding-gate attendant and the wife of a

hijacker shot to death by him prior to his own suicide. At least three
passengers on United States flights have been wounded, 23 as well as
one pilot, two crew members2 4 and one stewardess.2 1 International
statistics are hard to find;2 6 however, the first successful hijacking
from the U.S.S.R. resulted in the death of a stewardess and injury to
two pilots, and a 1948 diversion from Bulgaria to Turkey left two
20. Washington Post, Nov. 25, 1971, § A, at 3, col. 2. A record entitled "D.B.
Cooper, Where are You?" was released, although several radio stations pulled it
off the air following protests from the pilots' association, and 5,000 "D.B.
Cooper" T-shirts were sold in the Portland area. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1972, at
54. An imitator failed to get away with $300,000 a month later, when the crew
escaped while the plane was on the ground, even though the would-be hijacker
had kept one passenger as a hostage to insure that the parachutes given him were
in working order. Washington Post, Dec. 25, 1971, § A, at 2, col. 1.
21. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1972, at 28, col. 6.
22. Washington Post, March 18, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 5.
23. SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 2, 1971, at 30.
24. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1972, at 28, col. 1.
25. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1971, at 24, col. 1.
26. The figure of 44 dead passengers, 5 dead crew members and 1 crashed
plane was offered in 1969. Toothman, Legal Problems of Skyjacking, ABA
SECTION OF INS., NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION L. PROCEEDINGS 251,

255 (1969).
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pilots dead and one crew member wounded. 7 Five passengers were
wounded, one severely, when Israeli troops killed two hijackers to free
90 passengers and ten crew members on a Sabena plane held at Tel
Aviv airport by Palestinian guerrillas seeking the release of 317
Palestinians imprisoned in Israel.2" All of these casualties arose from
resistance-either real or perceived-to the wishes of the hijacker. As
yet, American air travelers have been spared the potentially
catastrophic results of airborne explosive discharge,2 9 as well as the
possibility of stray bullets rendering critical aircraft systems inoperable; 30 but passengers of the Boeing 747 blown up in Cairo on
September 6, 1970, were barely 100 yards away from the plane when
31
the explosions began.
2. Indirect Dangers.-In addition to these immediate dangers,
hijacking raises a number of indirect hazards:
[T] here is the danger that the hijacker would insist on diverting the flight to
a destination beyond the range of the aircraft's fuel supply, resulting
perhaps in a ditching, crashlanding, or emergency landing at an airport
lacking the required runway length for the aircraft involved. The aircraft
could be diverted to an airport at which bad weather or lack of navigational
aids would make an approach or landing unsafe.32
Although there have been no crashes since a hijacked plane went down
off the coast of Cuba on November 1, 1958, 33 killing 17 of the 21
passengers, the testimony of hijacked pilots clearly communicates the
dangers inherent in situations where, for example, the crew was not
allowed to touch any of the controls for fifteen minutes.3 4 Further
examples include the TWA jet diverted to Damascus in August, 1969,
which was controlled by hijackers who neglected to recalculate their
previously obtained fuel consumption figures to allow for higher
consumption at lower altitudes; the pilot landed on the first pass with

27. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
28. Washington Post, May 10, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 4.
29. One passenger was killed, however, by the explosion of a hijacker's
grenade on a Cuban flight. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1971, at 30, col. 5.
30. Aviation Safety Hearings,supra note 17, at 87.

31.

TIME,

Sept. 21, 1970, at 20.

32. Opening Statement of U.S. Delegation to the Second Meeting of the
ICAO Legal Subcommittee on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, IFALPA Doe.
70A104, attach. A, at 1. The author was granted access to the files of the
International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA) at their London
offices.
33. FAA List, supra note 2, no. 21; N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1958, at 1, col. 1.
34. Aviation Safety Hearings,supra note 17, at 283.
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nearly empty tanks.3" Other indirect dangers to passengers are
illustrated by the heart attack suffered by a passenger on a Turkish
plane held by Turkish hijackers in Bulgaria.3 6 Moreover, the indirect
dangers no longer cease with the landing of the aircraft-passengers,
crew and plane are now frequently held hostage.
B. The Monetary Cost of Hijackings
1. DirectCosts to Air Carriers.-Hijackings also impose considerable
cost and inconvenience on air carriers. The direct cost to an American
airline of a hijacking to Havana--including landing costs, navigation
charges, fuel prices, food, and passenger services-is estimated to run
from 3,000 to 10,000 dollars, which is substantially more than such
services would cost at American airports.3 7 One Venezuelan plane was
charged over 31,000 dollars after four days detention in Havana,
apparently in retaliation to the detention of Cuban fishing boats by

35. AvIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 8, 1969, at 22;
N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
36. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1972, at 2, col. 3.
37. Wurfel, supra note 1, at 823.
Two itemized lists of costs are much lower:
August 24, 1970-Boeing 727:
$115.00
Landing fees
264.00
Handling
40.00
Flight Dispatch
60.00
Aeronautical services
52.50
Customs services
341.00
Catering
$872.50
TOTAL
August 20, 1970-DC-9:
$ 73.50
Landing fees
216.00
Handling
40.00
Flight dispatch
60.00
Aeronautical services
12.25
Parking
152.72
Fuel
52.50
Customs services
353.50
Catering
200.00
Transportation
$1,160.47
TOTAL
Figures obtained from Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs on
Aircraft Hijacking, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Aircraft
Hijacking Hearings]. The bill is paid by the State Department through the Swiss
Embassy and passed on to the carrier.
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Venezuela."8 Of considerably greater impact, however, is the average
loss of 15,000 dollars revenue per aircraft per day of detention.3 9
Further direct costs to air carriers have, of course, been imposed by
the wave of hijackings solely for extortion. New costs have also been
imposed on the airlines by the destruction of aircraft by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in some of the Middle
Eastern incidents. The cockpit of a TWA 707 was blown up in Syria in
August, 1969, requiring 2.7 million dollars in repairs, and the four
aircraft destroyed in September, 1970, were valued at 52 million
dollars.4" One arm of the PFLP used the threat of destruction of a 25
million-dollar Lufthansa plane and fourteen crew members to extort
five million dollars from Lufthansa after the plane had been diverted
to Aden and the 172 passengers released. 4 In this case, the West
German Government bore the costs, having agreed to bear the risks of
hijacking when hijacking insurance became too expensive for the

airline.

42

2. Indirect Costs to Air Carriers.-Somepassengers have attempted
to pass on their "costs" to the airlines by bringing suit for damages.
Litigation arising from flights originating in the United States
(regardless of the place of landing) must be grounded on negligence,43
or negligent breach of contract.4 4 Apparently, no domestic case has
reached a final reported adjudication. International flights are gov-

38. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1969, at 81, col. 4.
39. Aviation Safety Hearings,supra note 17, at 9.
40. SATURDAY REVIEW. Jan. 2, 1971, at 30. The airlines have not yet
collected from their insurers, as different groups carried the war-risks and ordinary
liability, and a question arises of which policy is applicable in the circumstances.
Interview with D.L. Morgan of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Washington,
D.C., Nov. 26, 1971.
41. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1972, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Feb.'26, 1972, at 1,
col. 8. Surprisingly, no demand was made for the release of five Jordanians held in
West Germany for terrorist shootings, nor for the release of four guerrillas held in
Egypt for the assassination of the Jordanian premier. Even more ironically, the
South Yemen Government extorted $1,000,000 of the ransom money from the
hijackers before allowing them to depart. NEWSWEEK, March 20, 1972, at 17.
42. Premiums had reached DM 13-15 million to cover the Lufthansa fleet.
Daily Telegraph (London), March 3, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
43. Evans, supra note 15, at 699-700.
44. These claims are usually supported by allegations of failure to screen out
hijackers, to which a number of defenses are available, either on contract or
assumption of risk. Toothman, supra note 26, at 255-57. See also Note, Aircraft
Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 72, 90-100 (1969);
Bradford, The Legal Ramifications of Hijacking Airplanes, 48 A.B.A.J. 1034,
1035-37 (1962).
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erned by the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement of
1966. A New York State Supreme Court judge has recently ruled that
a passenger on the TWA jet hijacked to Dawson's Field on September
6, 1970, may recover up to 75,000 dollars in damages against the
airline for "fright and distress" without proof of negligence, under the
absolute liability provisions of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions.4" Should this ruling be sustained and become binding, airline
costs could well rise substantially. Five suits have been filed against
Swissair as a result of the hijacking to Jordan, 46 and five against Pan
Am, in addition to an unspecified number that have been settled out
of court. 4 7 Furthermore, added security measures have also cost the

airlines; BOAC recently reported expenditures for security measures
aimed at hijackers of one million pounds per year. 4 8 Finally, of
course, no measure can be assigned to the added psychological
burdens placed on travelers and air carriers by the threat of hijacking.
3. The Relativity of the HijackingBurden.-The burden of hijacking
on passengers and airlines must not be exaggerated. The 10,000
passengers whose flights have been disturbed by hijacking incidents
since 1961 comprise a very small fraction of the 287 million annual air
passengers. Moreover, the occasional destruction of aircraft must be
seen as exceptions to the rule that states do return hijacked aircraft;
the four planes blown up in September, 1970, were clearly beyond the
effective power of any state (in fact, the 747 blown up at Cairo was
destroyed to protest the foreign policy of the state of landing, i.e.
Nasser's participation in peace talks).4 9 Cuba, for example, has
followed a policy of prompt returns (usually on the same day since
February 10, 1969) with only minor exceptions. 50 The worst record
45. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
46. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1971, at 37, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1970,
at 14, col. 5. A federal judge in the Southern District of New York recently
refused to dismiss one of the suits against Swissair, an action by a passenger who
claimed bodily injuries and mental anguish as a result of the hijacking. The judge
ruled that a hijacking is "within the ambit of the term 'accident' and sufficient to
raise the presumption of liability under the Warsaw Convention as modified [by
the Montreal Agreement]." N.Y. Law Journal, Nov. 9, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
47. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1972, at 83, col. 7.
48. Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug. 26, 1972, at 8, col. 2. In the U.S., a
tax of 8% on domestic tickets and $3.00 on international departures was imposed
to pay for the sky marshal program. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
49. TIME, Sept. 21, at 20.
50. A U.S. plane was held for three weeks in 1961 until exchanged for a
Cuban ship held under attachment in Norfolk, a U.S. plane held four days in
connection with the seizure by the United States of Cuban fishing vessels, and a
Fail, 1972
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for the return of aircraft belongs to the United States prior to
1961-eleven of 25 planes (eighteen hijacked, seven seized here) were
disposed of pursuant to court orders, and fourteen were returned.5 '
All other planes have been returned, although the Israelis had to
release sixteen Arabs held in Israel to recover a plane from Algeria in
1968, and the West Germans had to pay five million dollars for one of
theirs in 1971.2
IV. VALUE AND POLICY PREFERENCES

A. The Suppression of Hijacking
1. Universal and Absolute Values.-In formulating a policy for the
suppression of hijackings, it is necessary to weigh the value derived
from permitting the hijacking against the potential danger to the
innocent participants. Thus the desirability of the complete suppression of hijackings done solely for motives of personal gain or
ego-reinforcement cannot be disputed so long as the hijacking presents
any element of danger to passengers, crew or persons on the ground.
Similarly, hijackings done solely as political demonstrations are clearly
undesirable, for any danger to life should outweigh the value of
allowing this particular means of media access to dissident groups.5 "
Nor should hijacking for political advantage be permitted, since the
general undesirability of waging war on uninvolved civilians outweighs
the value of extending this activity to groups such as the PFLP, even
though few other viable strategies may be open to them.
2. Conflict of Values.-A more difficult problem of balancing
desirable outcomes is presented by the need to prescribe and apply
some regime to hijackings by political refugees, since sympathy for the
human rights of the refugee conflicts with both sympathy for the
rights of the passengers and the value of unhampered global

Venezuelan aircraft held four days for the same reason. 63 PROC. AM. Soc'Y
L. 191 (1969); N.Y. Times, June 2, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
The Cubans customarily have returned money stoken by hijackers from
passengers. Horlick, supra note 1, at 56. Algeria returned ransoms of $1,000,000
and $500,000 taken by hijackers in 1972. Anchorage Daily Times, Aug. 25, 1972,
at 27, col. 4.
51. At least one plane was returned after Cuba had entered a plea of sovereign
immunity through the Czech Embassy. 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 278, 407 (1961).
52. See note 41 supra.
53. Even in the closest possible case, where no legitimate media access is
available, equally newsworthy illegal acts can be performed with less danger to
nonparticipants.
INT'L
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communication. The category of "political refugee" is a very elastic
characterization; almost every hijacking has political coloration simply
from the choice of a state of landing unlikely to return the hijacker.
Therefore, certain preliminary distinctions may be drawn. First, no
sympathy, and hence no benefit, should be given to hijackers with
destinations attainable by legitimate means. Neither the danger to the
passengers nor the disruption of air travel are justifiable incidents of
the hijacker's inability to pay for an airplane ticket. Secondly, a
distinction may be drawn between escape by hijacking from prosecution for "political"5 4offenses and similar flight from prosecution for
"common" crimes.
Finally, the particular circumstances of the
actual incident must be examined to ascertain that the hijacking was
undertaken solely for the purpose of travel to political freedom, rather
than the more common fantasy-voyage.
B. Implementation of Suppression Strategies
1. Direct Suppression. (a) Ground Detection.-Not surprisingly,
the apparent ease of hijacking has sparked widespread interest in a
large number of schemes to halt the rising trend of seizures."5 At the
heart of the problem is the relative ease of taking over an airborne
aircraft, because of the extreme vulnerability of planes in flight.
Clearly, therefore, the most desirable strategy is to prevent hijackings
by screening out would-be hijackers on the ground, 6 thus removing
54. However, adherents to the theory that all crime is a rebellion against a
"system" would not recognize such a distinction.
55. Of 1,000 unsolicited suggestions, the 10 most popular have been:
(1) provide free transportation to Cuba for those desiring to leave the United
States;
(2) provide armed guards on all United States passenger flights;
(3) pay Castro to return hijackers to the United States;
(4) build a simulation of Havana airport in Florida;
(5) bulletproof the pilot's cabin, with one-way communication only;
(6) search each passenger, either by x-ray or metal detector;
(7) depressurize the plane's cabin or use sleeping gas on the aircraft;
(8) equip all crew members with Mace;
(9) use tranquilizer darts; and,
(10) require special identification cards for air travelers.
AIRCRAFT PIRACY REPORT, supra note 15, at 28.
56. The problem of actual ground attacks on aircraft is not dealt with here. A
Convention for the Supression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (aside from hijacking) was signed by 31 states in Montreal on September

23, 1971. This document parallels the Hague Convention in all respects except the
definition of the offense. 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1151 (1971).
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the danger of a crash. Pursuant to statutory authorization, a Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) tariff regulation allows airlines to refuse
transportation to anyone who refuses to submit to a search, or whose
conduct appears to be threatening."s Thorough searches of all
boarding passengers, however, would result in impractical delays.
Therefore, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Task Force on
Hijacking has sought the development and use of sophisticated
concealed-weapon detection devices."s Over 700 detection devices are
already in use, with an additional 900 likely to be authorized.5 9 For
example, Eastern Airlines by 1971 had magnetometers at 32 of its 106
terminals (the 32 terminals service approximately 75 per cent of
Eastern's passenger traffic) and 50 hand sets at smaller erminals."6
Many of the earlier detection models provided insufficient discrimination, but a model recently developed under FAA contract uses a
computer to distinguish between guns and other metal objects, and
then alerts ground personnel if firearms are detected. 6
But the deficiencies of even an ideal detector are serious. Most
current detectors, for instance, would miss the nonferrous gun used in
the attempted hijacking of an El Al plane on September 6, 1970. Of
107 weapons used in 94 United States hijackings, there were twenty
knives, 21 real and alleged explosives, three razors, one tear gas pen,
and one broken bottle-all of which would probably survive mechanical detection screening. Moreover, nothing could prevent the boarding
of some of the weapons actually used in past hijackings, such as a
cigarette lighter allegedly filled with acid, or an "explosive" cigar
box. 62 Finally, there is the fallibility of the agents manning the
detection devices: hijackers have boarded even after tripping a
detector when security agents were satisfied that the alarm had been
6
set off by metal items other than the weapon actually used. 1

57. This regulation implements the statutory authority of 49 U.S.C. § 1511
(1964). See Evans, supra note 15, at 703.
58. Such devices must combine a high probability of detection and a low
probability of false alarm, discriminate reliably between weapons and other items
without harm to people, and offer instant detection without human monitoring,
at reasonable cost. Aviation Safety Hearings, supra note 17, at 98.
59. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 17, 1972, at 2, col. 1.
60. SATURDAY RnvIEw, Jan. 2, 1971, at 31.
61. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 9, 1971, at 25.
62. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1971, at 37, col. 2.
63. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 1; see P. SNOW & D. PHIrLIPS,
THE ARAB HIJACK WAR 10 (1970); J. AREY, supra note 2, at 244; Aircraft
Hijacking Hearings,supra note 37, at 164.
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Detectors are meant to be used in conjunction with a discreetlyadministered personality profile, which FAA psychologists compiled
on the basis of interviews with unsuccessful and returned hijackers and
families of successful hijackers. According to Dr. John T. Dailey, the
FAA's chief psychologist, the profile is based solely on behavior,
rather than on physical appearance or ethnic criteria (although a
federal judge in Brooklyn suppressed evidence in a drug case on a
finding that an "ethnic element" may have led to the airport
search)."' The use of the profile usually eliminates the typical air
traveler-the businessman in a hurry-and thus the well-dressed and
well-briefed hijackers of the El Al jet in September, 1970, were able to
slip through El Al's similar profile." This dual screening system has
garnered most of the credit for the recent reduction in the number of
successful United States hijackings." 6 There were eleven successes in
26 attempts in 1971, contrasted with eighteen successes out of 27
attempts in 1970; eight of the eleven successes in 1971 fitted the
profile but were not screened. The CAB has blamed the slip-ups on the
failure of airline personnel to use the profile properly. 6 7 The overall
cost of the antihijacking program was 55 million dollars, including 37
million dollars for the sky marshalls-a rather stiff price to pay for a
slight reduction in successful hijackings. Moreoever, the hijackings
averted are probably those least likely to cause great danger or
disruption, i.e. the relatively unplanned flight to Havana for personal
reasons. On the other hand, it is desirable that some basic screening be
retained to weed out the grossly disturbed individual-arguably the
most dangerous hijacker-such as the Phoenix, Arizona hijacker who
had no particular destination in mind after collecting the 100 million
dollars he had demanded from the United States Supreme Court. 6
64. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
65. J.

AREY,

supra note 2, at 99, 240-41. Two would-be hijackers were

refused passage by El Al, and transferred to a Pan Am 747, which they hijacked to
Cairo; they used faked diplomatic passports to prevent a search. Aircraft Hijacking
Hearings,supra note 37, at 93.
66. In addition, Justice Department sky marshals reported 1,926 "incidental"
arrests in 1971, including 538 for narcotics violations, 205 for concealed firearms,

and 133 for concealed knives. Note, supra note 44, at 82-83. The fourth
amendment questions raised thereby remain unsettled. See United States v.

Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1098-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); 65 PRoc. Am. Socy
INT'L L. 88 (1971).
67. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1972, at 66, col. 1. United Air Lines and Pacific
Southwest Airlines were recently fined by the FAA for failure to screen
passengers properly. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1972, at 15, col. 6.
68. J. AREY, supra note 2, at 117-20.
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(b) Airborne Suppression.-The airlines' initial policy of total
nonresistance while the aircraft is airborne was exemplified by
Eastern's instructions:
The most important consideration under the act of aircraft piracy is the
safety of the lives of the passengers and crew. Any other factor is secondary.
Therefore, company policy is:
In the face of armed threat to any crew member, comply with the
demands presented.
Do not make an attempt to disarm, shoot out, or otherwise jeopardize the
safety of the flight.
To sum up: Going on past experience, it is much more prudent to submit
to a gunman's demands 69than to attempt action which may well jeopardize
the lives of all on board.
Moreover, the pilots have also favored this policy:
It is the general opinion of airline pilots, based on the experience of those
who have been hijacked, that there is almost no safe method of preventing a
determined hijacker from having his way once the aircraft is airborne. To
oppose violence with violence, in the particularly vulnerable circumstances
of flight, is regarded as being on balance more dangerous than to carry out a
hijacker's instructions to divert.... This is not to say that there are no
circumstances in which a hijacker can be successfully resisted in flight; only
that, in most cases, it is probable that the safety of the aircraft and
passengers will be best served by offering neither physical nor verbal
resistance and by
complying with a hijacker's instructions, so long as these
70
are practicable.
Recently, however, attitudes have changed, partially as a result of
the shootings of unarmed pilots," and the concept of airborne
resistance is becoming more accepted. 72 Armed sky marshalls now
ride American air carriers (although a pilot may request that they not
fly with him), and eighteen arrests were made aboard aircraft in 1971
(only six of which were in response to an announced or threatened
hijacking)."3 Nonetheless, no attempt to interfere will be made once a
crew member or passenger is held as a hostage by the hijacker.

69. CaribbeanHearings, supra note 5, at 14.

70. IFALPA Statement to the ICAO Council, Aug. 14, 1969, IFALPA Doc.
70A78, attach. A, at 3-4.
71. Aircraft HijackingHearings, supra note 37, at 9.
72. "When you are exposed to people of this character, you've got to make a
choice between total destruction for sure, and maybe part or total destruction in
an attempt to prevent the deliberate, total destruction of an airplane." J. AREY,
supra note 2, at 227.
73. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 3; FAA Release 72-15, Jan. 24, 1972,
at 3.
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The American penchant for gadgetry has applied itself to the
problem of airborne resistance and has motivated suggestions to use
sealed -cockpits, "Potemkin village" fake airports, depressurized
cabins, trap doors, sleep-inducing gases, Mace, and tranquilizer darts.
However, airborne resistance is not so simplistic a proposition as these
suggestions might indicate: anaesthetics (television mythology notwithstanding) allow the hijacker a few seconds in which to cause
considerable damage, and could also endanger other passengers; and
hijackers are often wary of attempts to land at the wrong airport. The
objections to sealed control cabins reveal the many conflicting
considerations: clearly, some communication is needed to deal with
flight emergencies, and the same channels could be used to "control"
the aircraft by threatening the stewardesses or others in the passenger
compartment. Moreover, the cabin door is designed to be frangible, in
case of crashes or emergencies-in one case, a fire melted the
stainless-steel wash basin before crewmen could get to the blaze from
the cockpit. 4 These often-suggested methods of airborne resistance,
therefore, actually emphasize the extreme vulnerability of an airplane
in flight and the consequent imprudence of any form of airborne
resistance. It is foreseeable, and probably desirable, that guards will be
removed from aircraft completely and be used to operate a wider
preflight inspection network, on the theory that the prevention of
hijackings must take place before the plane is in the air."
2. Indirect Suppression.-A less dangerous approach to the suppression of hijacking is deterrence through assured punishment.
Although this strategy assumes a certain capacity for rational analysis
on the potential hijacker's part, the assumption does seem to have
some validity: hijackers almost invariably aim for destinations from
which they expect not to be returned to a country interested in
punishing them. 6 This deterrent strategy has always been favored by
the United States, the pilots' organizations and the airline industry."

74. AIRCRAFT PIRACY REPORT, supra note 15, at 28; J. AREY, supra
note 2, at 215-19.
75. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1971, at 62, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1972, at 66,
col. 1. The increasingly frequent problem of hijackers on the ground holding
hostages to force the continuation of the hijacking should be handled as a normal
police problem.
76. Horlick, supra note 1, at 44-45. But see Stephen, "Going South "-Air
Piracy and Unlawful Interference with Air Commerce, 4 INT'L LAWYER 433,
437-38 (1970) (on the limited deterrent value).
77. See Loy, Some International Approaches to Dealing with Hijacking of
Aircraft, 4 INT'L LAWYER 444, 452 (1970) (Mr. Loy is the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs); INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
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Its effectiveness depends on the cooperation of a large number of
nations with varying outlooks and political interests.
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, Japan, Mexico,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain and the United States currently
have statutes aimed specifically at the crime of airplane hijacking, and
in Denmark and the United Kingdom such legislation is imminent."
In addition, many states choose to prosecute hijackers for related
crimes, such as kidnapping, assault, or violation of flight safety
regulations. 9 Conviction statistics, however, are considerably less
impressive when one considers that the crime is such that identification of the suspect is rarely a problem. Of 128 incidents involving
United States aircraft since 1961, 35 persons have been convicted of
air piracy or related crimes (ten in 1971), and ten persons have been
committed to mental institutions. An additional thirteen cases await
trial or the outcome of mental examinations, and there have been two
acquittals. Another hijacker was shot and killed in a bank robbery
after returning secretly to the United States." °
Of greater significance is the treatment meted out to hijackers who
land in Cuba. A considerable body of evidence suggests that since
1969, Cuban treatment of American hijackers has been quite harsh in
most cases.8 1 One hijacker who stole 1,700 dollars from the
passengers of the diverted aircraft was arrested by the Cubans upon
landing, and the Cubans returned the money, just as they had done
following the only other hijacking-theft. The voluntary return of
fourteen hijackers to the United States (via Canada) is evidence in
itself of the quality of Cuban treatment of hijackers; more publicity

AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATIONS, FACTS ABOUT

IFALPA 11, 12 (6th ed.

1970); K. Hammarskjbld (Director-General, IATA), Statement of Sept. 2, 1969.
78. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Program Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970); 8
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1175 (1969) (Cuba); 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
180 (1970) (Brazil); 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 185 (1970) (Mexico); 10
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 436 (1971) (France). Cf. D. COOPER, THE AIR
CODE OF THE U.S.S.R. 58 (1966).
79. See Fitzgerald, Development of International Legal Rules for the
Repression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 269,

272-77 (1969); Aircraft HijackingHearings,supra note 37, at 110.
80. FAA Release 72-15, Jan. 24, 1972, at 2-3. See generally Aviation Safety
Hearings,supra note 17, at 68-80.
81. See Aviation Safeiy Hearings, supra note 17, at 52, 88; J. AREY, supra
note 2, at 148-51, 261-65. On arrival, the hijacker reportedly is placed in jail for
intense questioning (Alben Barkley Truitt was held for three months) while the
Cubans ascertain that he or she is not a CIA agent, and is then removed to a
guarded area.
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about the conditions of life for hijackers in Cuba hopefully will deter
potential hijackers.
Punishment of hijackers has varied elsewhere, from two unsuccessful hijackers whose throats were slit by Ethiopian Airlines guards, to
Christian Belon, who stepped off the plane that he had diverted to
Beirut, announced, "I did it for Lebanon," and was released on bail of
$7.50 before the resulting international uproar resulted in new charges
being brought against him. Noteworthy is the trend of prosecution of
refugee hijackers from Eastern Europe by Western European countries, despite obvious political sympathy. For example, two East
Germans were each sentenced to two years in prison by a French
military court in West Berlin and two Poles were jailed for 27 months
and 24 months respectively by an Austrian court. In addition, charges
were brought in Sweden against two hijackers of Greek aircraft, and
Raffaele Minichiello was sentenced to seven and one-half years in
prison in Italy after his flight from the United States (he was released,
82
however, after eighteen months as a result of various amnesties).
Obviously, the problem of hijacking has been exacerbated by the
inability of the aggrieved country-usually the country of the aircraft's
registration--to bring the hijacker within its effective control for
prosecution. Cuba extradited one hijacker (a French national named
Albert Cadon) to Mexico in 1961, where he was sentenced to eight
years and nine months in jail, but subsequently refused to extradite to
Mexico two Mexicans and two Dominicans involved in the hijacking of
Mexican aircraft.8" Cuba returned Robert Labadie, an American, to
the United States in 1970 after the FAA dossier showing that he was a
mental patient arrived in Havana (a standard FAA practice). Otherwise, extraditions have resulted mainly from hijackings aborted before
the intended destination was reached, or in the extremely rare
which a state of landing was chosen that would return the
incident in
84
hijacker.
Even if the United States maintained diplomatic relations with
Havana, extradition of hijackers still could not be achieved because
hijacking is not among the offenses listed in the 1904 Extradition
Treaty. Additionally, in 1961 the Deputy Legal Adviser ruled that
transportation of neither kidnapped persons nor stolen property came

82. Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1970, § A, at 18, col. 1; Aircraft Hijacking
Hearings,supra note 37, at 110; see Horlick, supra note 1, at 58.
83. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1961, at 1, col. 4; Washington Star, April 30, 1971,
§ C, at 24, col. 5.
84. Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 3; J. ARmY, supra note 2,
at 236.
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within terms of the agreement.8" Cuban Law 1226 invites a bilateral
exchange of hijackers (aerial and marine), but the sweeping nature of
the law renders the terms of exchange unacceptable to the United
States. 86 New treaties that specifically include hijacking have been
negotiated with New Zealand, Spain, France, Italy and the United
Kingdom, and the treaties with Spain and Italy include a presumption
that the offense is not political. Similar negotiations are underway
between the United States and thirteen other countries, and among
other states as well."
Extradition treaties, however, are not a practicable solution to the
problem of punishing hijackers. Such treaties are negotiated with
friendly countries, to which a hijacker is least likely to go, and they
are the type of agreement that is most likely to fall into desuetude
should relations between the two states become strained.8 8 Also,
irrespective of treaty obligations, it is unlikely that a United States
Government, for example, would wish to bear the political cost of
returning a refugee to the U.S.S.R.,8 9 just as the delicately balanced
Italian Government could hardly afford the political repercussions of
extraditing Minichiello to the United States. These same internal
political considerations prevent international reliance on a simple
prosecution procedure by the state of landing. Only an international
furor forced the rearraignment of Belon by Lebanon, and Minichiello
was not tried until his popularity had waned. None of the Arab
guerrilla hijackers have been tried in Arab countries. It seems clear,
therefore, that only some form of external, or international, obligation
can insure prosecution for all hijackers, especially where the government
is either delicately balanced or less than normally responsive to the
usual diplomatic pressures.
The means of insuring punishment must embrace the political
realities of both probable effectiveness and the desirability of
preventing each type of hijacking, outlined earlier. No major difficulty, therefore, should be presented by treaty agreements requiring

85. 6 M.WHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

790 (1968).

86. 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 407 (1961).
87. Aircraft HijackingHearings, supra note 37, at 84, 110.
88. Cf. Lissitzyn, International Control of Aerial Hijacking: The Role of
Values and Interests, 65 PRoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 80, 85 (1971).

89. The aborted attempt to defect by S. Kudirka and the criticism of the
Coast Guard for its allowing the Russians to remove him from a Coast Guard
vessel during fishing negotiations indicate the political risk involved for the U.S.
Government to return a hijacker from the Soviet Union who has already landed in
the United States. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec.
4, 1970, at 12, col. 1.
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that hijackers motivated solely by personal reasons be punished by the
state of landing; even the Italians managed to sentence Minichiello to
seven and one-half years in prison, despite a sympathetic public.
Mandatory extradition is not a realistic solution, given the contours of
political dissonance throughout the world; but the alternative of
returning the hijacker should definitely remain open, since the state of
landing presumably has no interest in serving as a haven for another
state's misfits-as was demonstrated by Cuba's return of Robert
Labadie, a mentally disturbed veteran, to the United States.
Although it is equally desirable to have the state of landing punish
hijackers acting for purposes of political demonstration or to gain
political advantage, it is unrealistic to expect that this will happen very
often, assuming that hijackers will continue to exercise the modicum
of common sense necessary to divert the plane to a state sympathetic
to their views. No Arab government would dare defy popular
passions-which, ironically, the governments themselves have molded
-by pressing charges against the perpetrators of the September, 1970
hijackings, even though the international impact of the incidents
prompted both criticism of the PFLP by Iraq, Syria, and At Ahram
(the semi-official Egyptian organ), and expulsion of the PFLP by the
Palestine Liberation Organization (the guerrilla umbrella organization).9" On the other hand, Lebanon did convict Belon, albeit on
minor charges, and France jailed (for eight and six months respectively) the two Italians who hijacked an Olympic Airlines plane to pass
out pamphlets denouncing the Greek junta. 91 Arguably, while
extradition is improbable in such cases, the existence of an international obligation would strengthen the hand of a government seeking
prosecution.
The case of "political refugees" using hijacking as a means to escape
to "freedom," either in the free societies of the West or in the
Socialist paradises of Cuba or China, is obviously more difficult. The
question of "political" asylum is usually explored in the context of
extradition,92 an approach unlikely to be employed in the case of
people fleeing from the Soviet bloc to Western Europe, or from the
United States and Latin America to Cuba. 93 The considerations of

90. TIME, Sept. 21, 1970, at 20, 27.
91. 65 PRoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 87, 90 (1971).
92. See, e.g., McMahon, Air Hijacking: Extradition as a Deterrent, 58 GEO.
L.J. 1135, 1138-40 (1970).
93. The United States refused to extradite the hijackers of three Czech planes
in 1950. 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 595 (1950); 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 85,
at 808-09. France refused to return the hijackers of a Polish plane diverted to the
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internal politics and human rights that underlie a refusal to extradite,
however, are not present with the same force where the decision is
more simply one of punishment: incarcerating "victims of oppression"
would not be a popular move for a government, but it certainly would
be a less explosive move than returning the refugee to the tender
mercies of the "oppressor." For example, Austria, Denmark, France
and West Germany all have punished hijackers from Eastern Europe,
even while granting asylum, on charges of theft of the aircraft, illegal
possession of weapons, jeopardizing passengers, and similar offenses. 4 The same reasoning applies to the human rights considerations: the rights of the hijacker should not be completely and
unconditionally eliminated by the imposition of mandatory extradition, but an appropriate punishment should be formulated and
enforced for the infringement of the rights of the passengers and crew
of the hijacked plane, as well as for the disruption of world air travel.
Even bona fide "political refugees" should not be exempted from
such sanctions, in order to prevent the opening of an unmanageable
and inconsistently defined "political offense" loophole. The severity
of the sanction, however, should be determined by the balancing test
used by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in considering the diversion of a
Yugoslav aircraft to Switzerland by three crew members in 1952:
Such a [political] character must also be attributed to offenses which were
committed in order to escape the constraint of a State which makes all
opposition and, therefore, the fight for power impossible.
In this connection there can also be applied the principle that the relation
between the purpose and the means adopted for its achievement must be
such that the ideals connected with the purpose are sufficiently strong to
excuse, if not justify, the injury to private property, and to make the
offender appear worthy of asylum.... In the present case the required
relationship undoubtedly exists; for, on the one hand, the offenses against
the other members of the crew were not very serious, and, on the other, the
political freedom and even existence of the accused was at 9stake,
and could
5
only be achieved through the commission of these offences.
In the above case, the balance weighed against extradition, but it need
not weigh as strongly against punishment without extradition. This
same standard could be used to determine the severity of punishment,
French sector of West Berlin in 1969. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
Cuba refused a Mexican request for the return of two Mexicans who hijacked a
Mexican plane to Cuba in 1971. Washington Star, April 30, 1971, § C, at 24, col.
5.
94. 65 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 91 (1971).
95. In re Kavic, Bjelanovic & Arsenijevic, 1 Arr~ts du TribunalF6dralSuisse,
Recueil Officiel 39, 78, 19 ANN. DIG. 371, 374 (1952).
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after a judicial examination of the alternate means of escape (if any)
and of the danger to which others would have been exposed had the
alternatives been chosen.
Real world considerations, however, pose problems for the deterrence plan of assuring punishment through international obligation.
For example, a state such as Cuba, even though it recognizes the
dangers posed to international aviation (in which it participates), may
refrain from punishing even hijackers motivated solely by personal
reasons, simply to avoid doing anything considered desirable by a state
with which it is on unfriendly terms. Moreover, collusive trials may
subject favored hijackers to only a minimal deprivation for their
mandatory punishment; in fact, internal politics may prevent altogether the punishment of any hijacker who claims a popular political
affiliation. For these reasons, hijacking also must be made an
international crime, so that any state within which an accused hijacker
is found could apply the appropriate penalty without regard to the
place of the alleged offense. Most hijackers motivated by personal
reasons are not interested in spending the remainder of their lives
within the social and geographic confines of the state of landing.16
Universal jurisdiction should also help deter the use of hijacking for
political demonstration or for the taking of hostages, because the
hijackers, after the initial offense, would be confined to those
countries that were strongly sympathetic to their aims.

V. THE

DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

REGULATION

A. Regulation by Private InternationalOrganizations
The interests of air carriers and crews are directly represented in the
international area by their respective organizations, the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Federation of
Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA). The IATA, spun off from the
1944 Chicago Conference on International Civil Aviation, is a
voluntary association of 103 scheduled international airlines from 84
countries. Its membership includes, inter alia, the national airlines of
Cuba, Lebanon, the U.A.R. and Czechoslovakia." While IATA's main

96. Fifteen have returned voluntarily to the United States from Cuba despite
near certain prosecution.
97. 13 Y.B. INT'L ORGANIZATIONS 237, 384 (1971). Although the Soviet
Aviation Workers Union does not belong to IFALPA, representatives of Aeroflot
have indicated privately that they agree with proposals for a boycott of receiving
states that fail to punish hijackers. See Stephen, supra note 76, at 442.
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concerns are economic and technical, the organization became
seriously concerned about hijacking in 1968, when it became a
persistent and serious threat to safe and efficient air carrier operations.
IFALPA is a federation of 57 national pilots associations, including
those of Cuba, Lebanon and the U.A.R.9 8 Because the interests of
other crew members are essentially identical to those of the pilots in
relation to the problem of hijacking, the International Transport
Workers Federation (ITWF) has generally followed the lead of
IFALPA. The focus of IFALPA is air safety and working conditions;
therefore, hijacking has been of very great concern, especially since
1968. Neither IATA nor IFALPA has been able to take unilateral
measures to insure that all receiving states punish hijackers. IATA
cannot force those among its member carriers that are owned or
otherwise controlled by their state to controvert the wishes of those
states (e.g., by an IATA-run suspension of air service), nor can it affect
states serviced by nonmembers.
The pilots' associations, acting both independently and through the
international organization, have exerted pressure on states in which
member associations provide significant air service. For example,
following the detention of an Israeli plane, crew and passengers by
Algeria in 1968, the President and Deputy President of IFALPA went
to Algiers, reportedly to threaten an air boycott.9 9 The hostages were
released, however, and the boycott was abandoned.1"' The limits of
IFALPA power were indicated by the dissent of the Lebanese pilots,
and by the threat of an Arab union to blacklist any boycotting
airline.1 1 IFALPA's 24th Conference, held in March, 1969, authorized boycotts of any states that refused to punish hijackers. 10 2 On
September 1, 1969, the Federation threatened a 24-hour worldwide
stoppage unless Syria were forced to release two Israelis detained
following a PFLP hijacking to Damascus, although the pilots evidently
were persuaded by U Thant not to follow through on their threat."0 3
98. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIRLINE PILOTS AssOCIATIONS, SOME FACTS ABOUT IFALPA (6th ed. 1970); IFALPA File 2/5/2. See
note 32, supra.

99. Most air service to Algeria was flown by members of the French
member association, which announced on August 14, 1968, that a boycott would
begin on August 19. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1968, at 15, col. 1.
100. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1968, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
101. Aviation Safety Hearings, supra note 17, at 275; N.Y. Times, Aug. 15,
1968, at 15, col. 2.
102. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
103. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,
1969, at 15, col. 1; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, April 13,
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A worldwide 24-hour boycott, called by IFALPA after a series of
hijackings culminated in the murder of a Czech pilot, was unable to
overcome court orders in the U.S. and some pilot antipathy to striking
the airlines over hijacking, but probably should be given some of the
credit for reviving the interest of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in a convention providing for sanctions against
nations harboring hijackers.1" 4
B. Regulation by Public InternationalOrganizations
1. The Organizations.-The most obvious source of an authoritative prescription of an international obligation on states to punish
hijackers is the United Nations. It is possible that some U.N. action on
hijacking would have been obtained, but for that body's preference
for viewing hijacking as a technical subject more within the competence of ICAO (reflecting a fear of political roadblocks in the
Security Council and General Assembly)"0 ' and considerations of
timing. By the time that the hijacking problem had assumed
proportions sufficiently significant to engage the attention of the
entire world community, the leading aviation states had already
initiated action in ICAO. Hijacking did not become a real threat to
world peace until September, 1970, by which time a consensus had
been formulated through ICAO.
At a meeting on November 19, 1969, of the Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the General Assembly, a Dutch delegate, speaking for
28 states, put forward a draft resolution on hijacking."0 6 The
resolution, which was adopted without change by the General
Assembly on December 12, 1969, by a vote of 77 to 2 with 17
abstentions, did no more than "call upon" states to insure that their
national legislation permitted the prosecution of the hijacker, "urge"

1970, at 45-47. The Austrian Airline Pilots Association wrote to the Austrian
Minister of Justice to request that two Poles who hijacked a plane to Vienna be
prosecuted without political consideration. Letter of Dec. 9, 1969, IFALPA File
2/5/2; see note 32 supra. An independent group of pilots chartered a 747 to give
80 U.N. delegates an airborne seminar on hijacking, featuring 18 crew members
who had experienced hijacking, to dramatize the need for prompt ratification of
the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal agreements. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1971, at 82, col.
1.
104. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1972, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, at 1,
col. 8; N.Y. Times, June 20, 1972, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1972, at 20,
col. 5.
105. Statement by C.A. Stavroupolous (U.N. Legal Counsel), March 4, 1970,
in ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, at 171-74 (1971).
106. 24 U.N. GAOR, 265, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1154 (1969).
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that hijackers be prosecuted, "invite" states to accede to the Tokyo
Convention of 1963, and "urge" support for the efforts of ICAO to
put together a convention on the unlawful seizure of civil aircraft."0 7
The entire Soviet bloc abstained from voting in the Legal Committee
except Poland, which, despite dissatisfaction with the draft resolution,
voted for its adoption because "the text was the minimum that the
Sixth Committee could submit to the international community in the
circumstances.' 0
The weakness of the resolution was obliquely
admitted by the sponsor, who noted the consensual nature of the
process by which it had been drafted. 0 9
The ICAO probably is the logical forum for the development of
international prescriptions regarding hijacking. ICAO, a specialized
agency of the United Nations since 1947, is comprised of 122
states, 110 including every state to which aircraft have been diverted
except North Korea, North Vietnam, and East Germany (all of whom
presumably remain aloof because of membership held by their
"counterpart" states), and has working relationships with all the major
aviation groups. (especially IATA) and all the major international law
groups. Especially significant was the accession of the U.S.S.R. on
November 14, 1970. 11
2. The Tokyo Convention.-The involvement of ICAO with the
unlawful seizure of aircraft began with the Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Convention)." 2 The claims of prescriptive jurisdiction over airborne
crimes that had been made prior to the Tokyo Convention were
inconsistent and frequently conflicting." 3 The Tokyo Convention is
107. G.A. Res. 2551, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 108, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969). Cuba and the Sudan cast the negative votes (although the Sudanese
delegate later claimed that he should have been recorded as abstaining). Van
Panhuys, supra note 1, at 1, n.2.
108. 24 U.N. GAOR, 377, 378, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1172 (1969).
109. 24 U.N. GAOR, 371, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1171 (1969).
110. List of member states supplied by ICAO.
111. 13 Y.B. INT'L ORGANIZATIONS 1010-27 (1971); 1 EUROPA Y.B. 48
(1971).
112. Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (effective Dec.
4, 1969). As of April 26, 1972, the Convention had been ratified or acceded to by
51 states. Treaty Information Office, U.S. State Dep't.
113. The preexisting lacunae in national jurisdictions are typified by United
States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), which demonstrated that it

was possible in 1950 for an American to commit mayhem on another American
aboard a United States aircraft over the high seas without falling within any state's
jurisdiction. Similar cases in other states are found in DE F. BILLYo u,AIR LAW
224-40 (1963).
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characterized as "lawyers' law," and was intended to rationalize the
many claims of prescriptive jurisdiction over airborne crimes." 4 The
general provisions of the Tokyo Convention are discussed extensively
elsewhere and will not be treated in detail here."'
They are,
however, important here because they exclude no criminal jurisdiction
that is exercised under national law. 116 Moreover, they do not
mandate extradition or prosecution of hijackers; therefore, the
usefulness of the Convention for the suppression of hijacking is
limited to the rare situation in which the hijacker is within the
effective power of a state interested in prosecuting him or her.11
The proposal that specific provisions concerning hijacking be
included in the Tokyo Convention was first made by the United States
and Venezuela at a meeting of the Legal Subcommittee in Montreal in
1962.11
The joint proposal was adopted with some changes as
article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, which requires contracting
states to "take all appropriate measures to restore control of the
aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the
aircraft...
." and to "permit its passengers and crew to continue their
journey as soon as practicable, and... return the aircraft and its cargo
n9
to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.""

114. For a summary of the various jurisdictional claims by ICAO members in
1959 see ICAO Doe. 8111-LC/146-2, at 160-65 (1959).
115. The best brief account is in 1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, Ain
LAW 701-06 (P. Keenan, A. Lester & P. Martin 3d ed. 1966). For a detailed
exposition see S. Shubber, Jurisdiction over Crimes on Board Aircraft, 1968,
(unpublished thesis at Cambridge University). See generally 1-2 ICAO, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW, TOKYO (1963) (containing the
Minutes and Documents of the Tokyo Conference).
116. Tokyo Convention, arts. 3(3), 4.
117. See generally Mendelsohn, In-flight Crime: The International and
Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 509, 513-14
(1967).
118. Fitzgerald, supra note 79, at 280. The Tokyo Convention was not aimed
at preventing hijacking, as is sometimes thought. See Horlick, supra note 1, at 35
& n.16. The first draft of the Convention goes back to Geneva in 1956, six years
before the first mention of hijacking as a separate matter. Article 11, which
addresses unlawful interference with aircraft, was added only in the hope of
obviating the need for a separate protocol. See Shubber, supra note 115, at 41;
Wiberforce, Crime in Aircraft, 67 J. ROYAL AERO. Soc'Y 175, 180 (1965).
119. The drafting history of article 11 is well covered in Fitzgerald, supra
note 79, at 280-83. See also Shubber, Is Hijacking of Aircraft Piracy in
InternationalLaw?, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 193, 194-98 (1968-69).
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The inadequacy of the Tokyo Convention as an effective measure
for the repression of hijacking has been widely recognized.1 20 The
missing element of the Tokyo Convention became quite apparent as
hijackings increased in 1968 and 1969:
The weakness in the Tokyo Convention is the lack of any provision for the
return of the hijacker. It deals with a number of subjects, and the article
pertaining to unlawful seizure calls only for the restoration of proper
control1 21of the aircraft and forward movement of passengers, crew and
cargo.
Even the minimally rational hijacker will have the foresight to divert
the hijacked plane to a country whose international relations militate
against the possibility of his being extradited for prosecution,
pursuant to the permissive provisions of the Tokyo Convention. This
weakness of the Convention, however, is not so surprising when one
recalls that it was adopted in 1963, when hijacking was perceived as a
somewhat amusing problem for the United States and certain other
American countries. At that time, only a fairly weak provision was
sufficiently acceptable to insure its inclusion in the Convention. 2 2
3. Aftermath of the Tokyo Convention.-Dissatisfaction with the
Tokyo Convention was expressed by several delegates at the Sixteenth
ICAO Assembly in September, 1968, in Buenos Aires, both at the
plenary meetings and at sessions of the Legal Committee. In resolution
A16-37, the ICAO Assembly urged all states to give immediate effect
to the principles of article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, and directed
the ICAO Council to arrange a study of other measures. The ICAO
Council dropped a reference to prosecution from its eventual
resolution, but directed the ICAO Legal Committee to establish a
subcommittee to examine both the development of model national
legislation and the possibility of an international convention dealing
with the prosecution of hijackers. 2
The subcommittee's pre-

120. E.g., INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, HIJACKING OF
76, 81, 91, 96, 105 (E. McWhinney ed. 1970) (Provisional Report
and Draft Resolution). See generally AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (E. McWhinney ed. 1971); Boyle & Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 30 J. AIR L. &
COM. 305 (1964).
121. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 8, 1969, at 14.
122. See Note, Air Piracy: The Role of the InternationalFederation of
Airline PilotsAssociations, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 79, 85-86 (1970).
123. ICAO Doc. 8779, Res. A/16, at 92 (1968). See generally Volpe &
Stewart, Air Hijacking: Some Domestic and InternationalResponses, 59 Ky. L.J.
273, 291 (1970).
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liminary work indicated that universal jurisdiction over hijackers,
coupled with state obligation either to prosecute or to extradite, would
reach the desired results. The need for careful attention to the right of
asylum was also noted." 4 These goals were amplified in an
introductory note by the ICAO Secretariat a month before the
meeting of the subcommittee in Montreal on February 10, 1969:
[I] t is suggested that the objectives might well be to obtain the consent of
as many States as possible that(a) "unlawful seizure" of aircraft in flight and attempts thereat shall be
recognized as a penal offence subject to the jurisdiction of every such State,
irrespective of whether the act took place in or outside of the territory of
any State,
(b) each State would take necessary measures to establish such
jurisdiction, and,
(c) a State would extradite such offender if found within its territory,
unless it has decided to try him, but careful study will be necessary as to
whether a State could refuse a request for extradition in specified cases,
for example, in the case of its own national, or to preserve the right of an
individual to seek asylum in certain circumstances.
The above objectives could be attained either by the enactment of uniform
national legislations by the consenting States or by means of an international instrument. Such instrument might well be one which would leave
untouched the Tokyo Convention, some provisions of which would remain
applicable to certain aspects of the problem of "unlawful seizure," but
would contain complementary provisions which, without amending the
Tokyo Convention, would fill gaps... and would also include other
provisions which a proper study of the subject might indicate. 125
The subcommittee met twice (February 10-22 and September
23-October 3, 1969), and decided that an international convention
would most effectively achieve the desired objectives. A draft
convention was produced that defined a new international offense of
"unlawful seizure," although the subcommittee reduced the likelihood of effective prosecution by dropping provisions for universal
jurisdiction." 6 The Legal Committee, meeting in Montreal from
February 9 to March 11, 1970, made minor changes 2 7 before passing

124. 65th Session of the ICAO Council, ICAO Doe. C-P/4885, at 3-4 (1968).
125. ICAO Doc. 8838-LC/157, at 35, 36 (1969).
126. For an analysis of the work of the subcommittee see Fitzgerald, supra
note 79, at 286-94. See generally ICAO Doc. 8838-LC/157 (1969) (containing the
Reports and Documents of both meetings of the subcommittee).
127. See 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 669 (1970). See generally ICAO
Doc. 8877-LC/161 (1970) (containing the Minutes and Documents of the
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the draft on to the Diplomatic Conference at the Hague on December
1, 1970.
4. The Hague Convention.-The Convention for the Suppression of
was apUnlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague Convention) 128
proved by a unanimous vote (74 for, none opposed, Algeria and Chile
abstaining)12 9 at the Hague on December 16, 1970. Fifty states
signed immediately (a fairly high number), and thereby assumed the
obligation to do nothing to frustrate the purpose of the agreement.
The treaty took effect on October 14, 1971, and by April1 3026, 1972,
ratifications or accessions had been deposited by 30 states.
The Preamble of the Convention states concisely the concerns of
the principal aviation states of the world: the danger accompanying
hijackings, and the consequent disruption and discrediting of the most
important single means of global interchange.
Article 1, which defines the offense, was carried over unchanged
from the Legal Committee draft. It includes seizures by force or
blackmail, but not by fraud or bribery. Article 2 obliges contracting
states to make the offense punishable by "severe penalties," which are
left undefined.
Paragraph 1 of article 3 is identical to the definition of "in flight"
used in article 5(2) of the Tokyo Convention, 3 ' and extends beyond
the Legal Committee draft to include the period of taxiing, and also
Seventeenth Session of the Legal Committee Relating to the Subject of the
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft). Among the changes made by the Legal Committee
from the subcommittee draft was the extension of jurisdiction to include states in
which the plane lands with the hijacker aboard, as well as the state in which the
hijacker actually leaves the plane. Compare 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 77
(1969) (final subcommittee draft) with 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 669
(1969) (Committee draft). There was no discussion of universal jurisdiction by the
Committee, although it had been urgently recommended by the International Law
Association as necessary for effectiveness. See 54 INT'L L. Assoc. REP. 342,
358 (1970).
128. Dec. 16, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971).
129. The Chilean delegation was awaiting instructions from the newly elected
Allende government, while Cuba, adhering to its preference for bilateral
arrangements, was not present.
130. As of April 26, 1972, the following states had ratified or acceded to the
Hague Convention: Beylorussian S.S.R., Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica,
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ecuador, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Mongolia, Niger, Norway,
Paraguay, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad-Tobago, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States.
131. Compare Tokyo Convention, supra note 112, art. 5(2) with Hague
Convention, supra note 128, art. 3(1).
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Paragraph 2
the time on the ground during forced landings.
and
customs
military,
parallels the Tokyo Convention in excluding
to
Convention
the
police aircraft. Paragraph 3 excludes application of
if
are
included
flights
hijackings solely within one state (domestic
than
other
state
in
a
diverted to another state), unless taking place
that of registration. Paragraph 4 provides that hijackings within one
state of a joint-operating air transport agency will not be covered, but
that an interstate diversion of a plane operated by such a body will be
included. Paragraph 5 (added at the Hague) applies the operative
features of the Convention (i.e. custody, prosecution, extradition) to
all hijackings, including purely domestic incidents, as long as the
alleged offender is found within the territory of a contracting state
other than the state of registration (which presumably has national
legislation concerning the hijacking of its own airplanes within its
territory). This section was added as part of the provision for universal
jurisdiction.
Article 4 provides much of the backbone of the Convention, by the
addition of a form of universal jurisdiction 3 ' to the bases of
jurisdiction provided by the Legal Committee (state of the flag and
each state of landing). Article 4(1)(c), dealing with aircraft leased
without crew, was added to deal with the burgeoning nonscheduled
air transport business. Article 5 assimilates international operating
agencies (or joint air transport operating agencies) into the Hague
regime by providing that one of the participating states be designated
as the state of registration for purposes of the Convention. Article 6,
detailing the obligation to take custody of alleged offenders within the
territory of contracting states, is given greater significance by the
obligation imposed by articles 3(5), 4(2) and 7 to either prosecute or
extradite 4alleged offenders without regard to the site of the alleged

offense.'3

132. 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 669, 670 (1970) (Legal Committee
Draft).
133. Article 4 requires each contracting state to "take such measures as may
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him... ." This
form of universal jurisdiction was added at the initiative of Spain, Switzerland and
the U.A.R. True universal jurisdiction (hanging a pirate wherever he or she may be
found) is probably undesirable; one wishes neither encroachments on the
territorial sovereignty of other states to obtain custody, nor attempted arrests in
flight over the high seas, where resistance could be dangerous to all.
134. Normally, identifying the hijacker poses no problem, but some flexibility for doubtful cases clearly is intended by the first clause of article 6: "Upon
being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State in the
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Article 7, which sets out the obligations to extradite or prosecute
an alleged offender found within the territory of the contracting state,
is the heart of the Convention. In view of the rejection of the wording
of the Draft Convention,1 3
article 7 must be interpreted as creating
an obligation to press prosecution as far as possible (an absolute
obligation cannot be imposed on states with an independent prosecuting arm). Other changes in the language of the Legal Committee
Draft are understood by the United States to exclude any consideration of political motives in the decision to prosecute. 136 An attempt
to include the phrase "regardless of motive" was rejected by the
Conference. 13" The language of the General Assembly Resolution of
November 25, 1970,138 however, indicates an international consensus
that hijackers be prosecuted regardless of motive, as does the
resolution of the Eighteenth Commission of the Institut de Droit
1 39
International.
Article 8 is intended to facilitate extradition of hijackers among
contracting states. It provides that hijacking, as defined in the
Convention, shall be included as an extraditable offense under all
existing extradition treaties of contracting states, thus circumventing
the problem of amending existing treaties. Additionally, it provides
that hijacking shall be considered an extraditable offense between
states that do not make the existence of a treaty a condition to
extradition. The frequent limitation of extradition treaties and laws to
territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present, shall take him
into custody.... ." (emphasis added). Once identification is made, article 6 allows
no exception to the obligation of the contracting state to insure the hijacker's
presence and to either extradite or submit him for prosecution.
135. Article 7 of the Legal Committee Draft Convention stated: "The
Contracting State which has taken measures pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 1,
shall, if it does not extradite the alleged offender, be obliged to submit the case to
its competent authorities for their decision whether to prosecute him. These
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of other
offences." 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 669, 671 (1970) (emphasis added). In
final form, the italicized portion of the Draft Convention was replaced with the
words "for the purpose of prosecution."
136. See note 135 supra. The final article 7 also carries the words "without
exception whatsoever" following "obliged" and replaced the phrase "other
offences" at the end of the article with the phrase "any ordinary offence of a
serious nature under the law of that State."
137. IFALPA Report, March 18, 1971, IFALPA Doc. 71A322. See note 32
supra.
138. G.A. Res. 2645, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 126-27, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
139. See APPENDIX A.
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offenses committed within the territory of the state requesting
extradition is avoided by treating the offense as if it were committed
within the territories of the state of registration, of landing with the
alleged offender on board, and of the airline's principal place of
business or, absent one of the above, the permanent residence of a
"bare-hull" lessee. Those provisions were all carried over from the
Legal Committee Draft, which had borrowed them from the 1929
Convention of the Suppression of Counterfeiting, 140 and are amplified by article 8(2), which gives a "treaty-extradition" state the option
of considering the Convention a treaty for purposes of extradition to a
"non-treaty-extradition" state. A number of states, led by the U.S.S.R.
and the United States, sought to make extradition mandatory, 4 1 but
this proposal was unacceptable to many smaller countries that
argued
142
that extradition in every instance might not be appropriate.
Article 9 supplements article 11 of the Tokyo Convention,
extending coverage of the Convention to situations in which the
hijacked plane, passengers, crew and cargo are not all in the same
state, and by requiring the contracting states to "facilitate" (rather
than merely "permit") continuation
of the journey, and to return the
1 43
aircraft and cargo "without delay.',
Articles 10 and 11 set out obligations to aid other contracting states
in prosecutions and to report actions taken in connection with
hijacking incidents. It is anticipated that airlines will also be helpful in
supplying witnesses and other assistance. Article 12 refers disputes
over interpretation or application of the Convention to arbitration,
and, if that fails, to the International Court of Justice. Paragraph 2,
however, explicitly recognizes the possibility of reservations to this
article (raising the implication that reservations to other articles are
not permitted). Article 13 provides that the Convention shall become
effective 30 days after ten ratifications have been deposited by states
that participated in the Hague Conference. 1'
Especially noteworthy
is the provision of article 13(1) opening the Convention to all states,
140. See ICAO Doe. 8838-LC/157, at 51; INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT 58 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).

141. ICAO Doe. 8838-LC1157, at 71.
142. Interview with K.J. Chamberlain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, March 23, 1971. See also D. Marrinan, Hijacking Act 1971, 23 N. IRE.
LEGAL Q. 238, 242 (1972).
143. The only problem involving the cargo on hijacked planes, as yet, was the
presence of secret NATO documents on the Pan Am 747 destroyed in Cairo on
Sept. 6, 1970. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1970, at 18, col. 6.
144. This reflects a desire for greater speed than the six years it took to get
the required twelve ratifications to the Tokyo Convention.
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rather than limiting participation to United Nations members or some
other formula. Article 14 permits denunciations, effective six months
following receipt of notice.
5. Background of the Hague Conference.-It is generally conceded
that the substantial strengthening of the Legal Committee Draft of
March, 1970, by the Hague Conference in December, 1970-i.e. the
provision of universal jurisdiction and the tightening of the obligation
to extradite or prosecute-was precipitated by the events of the
intervening months, notably the September, 1970, hijackings in the
Middle East and the successful hijackings from the U.S.S.R. to Turkey
in October, 1970.111 The Middle Eastern incidents clearly had a great
impact on many governments, including Arab states. Several Arab
states criticized the actions of the PFLP, and the U.A.R. strongly
supported the establishment of effective universal jurisdiction. Perhaps, however, the U.A.R.'s position was actually prompted by Arab
opposition to mandatory extradition--an obligation that Arab governments could hardly hope to fulfill and still remain in power.
Nonetheless, it is probable that the revision of article 9, which now
requires that states "facilitate," rather than merely "permit," the
continuation of the journey, was partially motivated by the plight of
the hostages held in Jordan in September, 1970, even though there
was little that Jordan or any state could have done in that situation
without risking a rather abrupt end to the hostages' travels.
6. Soviet and Bloc Response.-The Russian hijackings merely
'emphasized Soviet sensitivity concerning attempts to leave the
U.S.S.R. without permission. Four other Eastern bloc countries
(Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) had proposed mandatory extradition in the Legal Committee in March but had been
voted down, 18-5.146 Although it had participated in the Tokyo
Conference of 1963, the U.S.S.R. had joined ICAO only the month
before the Hague Convention, and perhaps it also wished to appear
cooperative as a new member.1 4 7 Soviet interest in the suppression of
145. See 65 Pnoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 76-77 (1971); G.A. Res. 2645,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 126, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); 64 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 50, 53-55 (1971).
146. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, at 59, 170 (1970).
147. A Soviet commentator explained Soviet participation as follows: "The
[Draft Convention] was necessitated by the recent increase in cases of aircraft
crews' being forced to change course in mid-flight and land in other countries.
Modern flying is such that any deviation of a heavy, fast-flying plane from its
route may result in a crash, endangering many lives. States concerned about air
safety and the prevention of hijackings have taken steps to work out and
introduce international legal rules that would make punishment inevitable and
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hijacking is further demonstrated by the ratifications deposited within
one year of the Hague Conference by the U.S.S.R.,
Bulgaria, Hungary,
148
Mongolia and the German Democratic Republic.
7. Weaknesses of the Hague Convention.-The major weaknesses of
the Hague text are fairly obvious, and, in fact, are mostly deliberate.
Article 1, for example, includes an explicit rejection by the Conference of a proposal that persons participating in the hijacking, but who
14 9
remain outside the aircraft, be included as offenders.
The failure to define "severe penalties" prompts the suspicion that
favored hijackers will get off easily, as did the two hijackers who used
an Olympic aircraft to distribute political propaganda (eight months
and six months imprisonment, respectively). Given the present
variance in national values, however, it is unlikely that any fixed range
of penalties could be agreed upon; nonetheless, a full year or more in
jail is hardly a trivial penalty, and nearly all sentences have exceeded
that. A harsh mandatory penalty could well prevent conviction
altogether in some cases. It is more likely that disparity in sentencing
will be a welcome means of distinguishing between "deserving"
political refugees (of all types) and other hijackers.
Article 7 may also be seen as a possible loophole, because
contracting states may hide behind the decision of an independent
judiciary to prosecute a given hijacker."
It is difficult, however, to
see how the wording of this article could be much stronger and still be
acceptable to most civil law countries. The obligation of a state to
serve as a grave warning to persons hijacking planes for personal reasons.... In
November 1970, the 25th General Assembly returned to a consideration of this
problem and adopted a resolution condemning all hijackings, emphasizing the
need to bring to justice or extradite hijackers, and urged to exert every effort for
the success of the Hague Conference. This Conference is to adopt a convention
providing for the severest penalties for offenders against air traffic, including
extradition to the state of the plane's registry for the purpose of administering
justice. The Convention should apply to internal, as well as international flights.
The Soviet Union's entry into ICAO and its participation in the Conference will
make the struggle against infringements of air safety and for the achievement of
ICAO's main objectives much more effective." INT'L AFFAIRS (MosCOW), Jan.,
1971, at 71, 72.
148. Moreover, the rapidity with which ratifications and accessions have been
deposited by a variety of states shows the urgency with which the problem of
hijacking is viewed by the world community.
149. This gap was filled by a 1971 convention signed in Montreal; see note
56 supra.
150. See INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT 56 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).
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prosecute an alleged hijacker is substantial, but cannot be absolute, in
order to allow for cases involving insufficient evidence and mental
incompetence. A certain discretion also should be reserved for the true
political refugee, but this should be a discretion only to temper the
punishment, not to excuse the offense entirely.
Given the provision of mandatory submission for prosecution, the
deliberate omission of mandatory extradition is not too serious a
defect. Mandatory extradition clearly would be the greatest deterrent
to hijackers. Equally clear, however, is that mandatory extradition
would be completely unacceptable to a large number of states, either
for reasons of political expediency or because of traditions of asylum.
Therefore, it was not surprising that a last minute deal between the
Arab and Latin American states made extradition under article 8(2)
optional rather than mandatory.
There are also several minor omissions: there is no provision
making custody on request of a contracting state an obligation in
article 6(1); nor is there a provision requiring that those in custody
receive the same treatment accorded nationals, as in article 15(2) of
the Tokyo Convention. Moreover, there is no explicit provision
forbidding the unreasonable detention of witnesses;' 5' nor is there an
express prohibition of reservations to articles other than 12. Finally,
there is no provision of extraterritoriality of hijacked passengers and
crew. All in all, however, the text of the Hague Convention adequately
seems both to set up prescriptions against the crime of hijacking and
to provide for the application by states of some penalty to all
hijackers, while leaving sufficient leeway to the state in order not to
unduly restrict the human rights of political refugees.
The usual criticism of the Hague Convention is that the desired
penalties will not be applied by some states, either through nonparticipation in the Hague regime, or by the flouting of Hague Convention
provisions by parties to the Convention. Attention has been drawn to
the fact that Cuba, apparently the favorite destination of hijackers, is
not a party to the Hague Convention and did not participate in the
Conference. The Cubans have chosen to stand on their offer to
negotiate bilateral agreements for the return of hijackers, on the basis
of Cuban Law 1226 of September 16, 1969. While the United States is
ready to jettison the human rights of refugee hijackers by swapping
unconditionally all hijackers with Castro in order to end the threat to

151. In 1969, three stewardesses and two passengers were detained in Aden
for five days, ostensibly as witnesses. Given the relative ease of identifying
hijackers, some reasonable time limit should be set. Letter of Sept. 22, 1969,
IFALPA File 2/5/2; see note 32 supra.
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its air industry, 5 2 it is not willing to return violators of all the
provisions of Law 1226, which include the crime of leaving Cuba
without permission, as well as violations of some customs and health
laws. Although there is a reciprocal reservation of the right of asylum
in Law 1226, it is limited to those fleeing a threat of "death or severe
repression," a reservation that American officials do not believe could
be observed in good faith without agreeing to extradite to Cuba for
crimes that the United States does not include in any other extradition
treaty.
Fortunately, since 1961 the hijackings to Cuba have been relatively
free from danger, so the need for application of the Hague Convention
penalties is less acute there than elsewhere. The only real solution to
the problem probably must await the reintegration of Cuba into world
and regional patterns of trade and transportation, to a point where the
Cubans' dislike of the disruption caused by hijackings will outweigh
their desire to do nothing that would please the United States
Government. Should hijacking become a greater threat before such a
change in relationships, it is possible that the states whose airlines
serve Cuba-Mexico, Spain and the U.S.S.R.-would exert pressure
sufficient to insure Cuban punishment of hijackers when those states
perceive such measures as necessary to end hijacking.
8. A Proposed Convention on Sanctions.-The need for the
imposition of sanctions against states refusing to apply the Hague
Convention was pointed out by the United States in the wake of the
September, 1970 Middle Eastern hijackings. Those hijackings, as well
as the seizure of a Greek plane in June, 1970, and a German plane in
October, 1972, were explicitly designed to extort the return of
members of the hijacking organization who had been jailed for earlier
hijackings or other terrorist activities. Effective sanctions are necessary
to "persuade" ideologically motivated states, such as Libya, from
vitiating antihijacking efforts by facilitating these "blackmail" hijackings. The U.S. requested a Special Meeting of the ICAO Council (Israel
had unsuccessfully sought sanctions at the June, 1970 Extraordinary
Assembly of ICAO), which was convened in Montreal on September
18, 1970.153 The Council
"Call[ed] upon Contracting States, in order to ensure the safety and security
of international civil air transport, upon request of a Contracting State to
consult together immediately with a view to deciding what joint action
should be undertaken, in accordance with international law, without

152. The United States has offered, without success, to agree to the simple
exchange of all hijackers.
153. Volpe & Stewart, supra note 123, at 300.
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excluding measures such as the suspension of international civil air transport
services to and from any State which after the unlawful seizure of an
aircraft, detains passengers, crew or aircraft contrary to the principles of
Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes,
or any State which, contrary to the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the
Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, fails to extradite or
prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure for international
blackmail purposes;
Direct[ed] the Legal Committee to consider during its Eighteenth Session,
if necessary by extension of the session, an international convention or
other international instruments:
(i) to give effect to the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph;
(ii) to provide for joint action by States to take such measures as may be
appropriate in other cases of unlawful seizure; and
(iii) to provide for amendment of bilateral air transport agreements of
concerning the authority to join in
contracting parties to remove all doubt
15 4
taking such action against any State.
The Legal Committee, which was in session considering the draft
convention against sabotage and ground attacks, set up a Special Legal
to consider drafts of a bilateral clause submitted by
Subcommittee'
Canada"5 6 and a multilateral sanctions convention submitted by the
United States."5 7 The Special Legal Subcommittee met during April,
1971, in Montreal, and considered the text of a multilateral
convention submitted jointly by the United States and Canada, which
provided a two step procedure-first, determining whether a state has
defaulted on its obligations under the Tokyo and Hague Conventions,
and secondly, determining the appropriate action to be taken, possibly
including suspension of air services to the defaulting state.' 8 The
subcommittee also prepared a questionnaire for states, the answers to
which were to be considered at the next meeting. 5 9 At this point,
the entire movement for sanctions came to a halt; the ICAO Assembly
decided to relegate the subject of sanctions to the inactive part of the
Legal Committee. 6" A wave of hijackings in 1972, and the pilots'
154. 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1286-87 (1970).

155. Id., at 1196.
156. Id., at 1206.
157. Id., at 1201.
158. ICAO Doc. LC/SC CR, app. D, April 27, 1971.
159. ICAO Letter to States, June 4, 1971, ICAO Doc. LM 3/6.3-71/155.
160. At that time, it was thought that "the result of this decision is that in
the foreseeable future no work will be undertaken on this subject." Letter from
ICAO to author, Nov. 16, 1971. The following objections were among those
raised at the April, 1971 meeting of the subcommittee in Montreal: the beliefs
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24-hour worldwide strike, however, prompted the revival of the
sanctions convention by ICAO. A seventeen-nation subcommittee
began consideration on September 4, 1972, of a United StatesCanadian proposal for an airline boycott of nations that either do not
return hijacked passengers and crews or refuse to prosecute or
extradite the hijackers.!" Notwithstanding the pressure generated by
the massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes, adamant opposition to such
sanctions by France' 6 2 and the Soviet Union (supported by Spain,
Tanzania, Egypt and Chile) led to the adoption of a weak British
compromise measure that was forwarded to the Legal Committee with
a recommendation that it be "studied," rather than with a recommendation of adoption. 163 It seems likely that the fate of a sanctions
convention remains dependent on the occurrence of hijacking episodes
spectacular enough to convince states of the need for such a weapon.
A sanctions convention would be a means of formalizing arrangements by major aviation states to protect their air traffic by seeking to
insure that all states punish those who endanger and disrupt international air travel. Thus, sanctions could as easily be applied to a state that

that only the Security Council could impose such sanctions and that some
detentions could be legal (under either court order or in a state of war); the
disputed applicability to states not parties to the Hague Convention or to the
sanctions convention; the possible conflict with obligations under bilateral air
agreements; and the lack of specific positive obligations on states of landing.
ICAO Letter to States, June 4, 1971, ICAO Doc. LM3/6.3-71/155, at 2-18.
"I don't believe any single specific reason can be given for why States, at this
stage, are unwilling to consider formal arrangements adopted in an international
convention to deal with the question of sanctions. For some, there is concern that
a convention might restrict their flexibility to deal with a particular situation
when they might be peculiarly affected. Others question whether such a
convention might conflict with provisions of the U.N. Charter. Still others are
concerned with obligations under bilateral air transport agreements which, they
argue, could preclude their cutting-off air services to a State pursuant to action
under a multilateral convention to which the bilateral partner was not a party.
Some States traditionally oppose concerted action other than through the United
Nations. Perhaps the most strongly argued position at the ICAO Legal
Subcommittee which met in April to consider a sanctions convention was that
such a convention would require universal acceptance to be effective, and there
was no realistic prospect of this." Letter from F.K. Willis, U.S. Dep't of State, to
author, Jan. 18, 1972.
161. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
162. The United States promptly broke off negotiations with France for a
new bilateral air agreement to express its displeasure with the French opposition.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1972, at 22, col. 3.
163. The Times (London), Sept. 17, 1972, at 5, col. 5.
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had withdrawn from the Conventions, or one that was never a member.
The International Coffee Agreement, under which nonsignatories sell
at a disadvantage, is usually cited as analogous."' All that is really
necessary is formal legal authority to enable states to unilaterally
breach bilateral air transport agreements with states failing to comply
with Tokyo and Hague Convention provisions. Both houses of the
United States Congress recently passed by overwhelming margins bills
giving the President unilateral authority to sever air service by United
States air carriers to any state harboring hijackers, or any state failing
to sever service by its carriers to a state harboring hijackers. 16"
Appropriate sanctioning activity should not, however, be limited to
the suspension of air services since the effectiveness of such a
suspension would otherwise depend solely on the degree of participation in the boycott by states supplying air service to the sanctioned
state.
Even effective sanctions, however, are not a complete solution to the
problem of hijacking. For example, sanctions would have been of very
little use in the situation that inspired the United States initiative on
sanctions-the September, 1970, hijackings-where the state, Jordan,
had amply fulfilled any international standard of due diligence by
fighting a civil war' 6 6 in seeking to free the hostages and punish the
hijackers.
Other proposals for insuring application of the Hague prescriptions to
hijackers have been made-e.g., a proposal by U Thant for an
International Criminal Tribunal, 6 7 which is unlikely in the near
future. The provision of universal jurisdiction should be viewed as
similar functionally to sanctions, as a means of seeking to insure that
the hijacker is punished by some state. Probably the best course for
the moment is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Hague Convention
in practice.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There probably is no means of completely suppressing the
"international blackmail" hijacker when the power of any state is

164. 65 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 89 &n.8 (1971).
165. The measure foundered, however, on a disagreement over other security
measures. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1972, at 61, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1972, at
32, col. 3.
166. Stronger measures, such as intervention, were considered by the United
States to endanger the hostages.
167. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1970, at 7, col. 1.
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ineffective, as in the September, 1970 hijackings, or when the stakes
are sufficiently high to the particular hijacking group to justify
sacrificing its members--an attitude that alarmingly is on the rise, as
evidenced in the 1972 Olympic Village kidnapping incident. The
completely irrational hijacker, who is, along with the member of a
guerrilla group, the most dangerous type, also will not be deterred by
threats of punishment. This type of hijacker, however, will turn to
other exploits as other hijackers are deterred and as hijacking ceases to
The certainty of punishment will
be a frequently televised drama. "'
effectively discourage the bulk of hijackings for personal reasons,
economic gain, or political demonstrations-as long as the punishment
is sufficient to turn the hijacker to other forms of personal fantasy,
economic endeavor or political propaganda. Many states now seem
willing to sacrifice whatever gains might accrue to them from
hijackings in order to guarantee the safety and smooth flow of the
international transportation network, by fulfilling their Hague Convention obligations to prosecute or extradite, even in the case of
political refugees. The prospect of a few years in jail, unfortunately,
will deter some genuine political refugees, but the promise of asylum
and limited punishment should strike the proper balance between the
community for
human rights of the refugee and the need of the world 69
a safe and dependable system of global transportation.
168. Some thought might be given to the preferability of hijacking to certain
other emotional outlets, such as shooting people from towers; similarly, guerrilla
hijackings are safer than attacks at airports and ticket offices. For a list of such
attacks see 54 INT'L L. Assoc. REP. 379-80 (1970).
169. Following the terrorism that marred the Olympic Games at Munich in
September, 1972, the United States took a number of steps toward deterring and
seeking punishment of hijackers. At Washington's invitation, fifteen nations
participated in a Special Subcommittee of ICAO in Washington to consider a
convention providing for the termination of air service to countries refusing to
prosecute hijackers. Addressing the meeting, Transportation Secretary John Volpe
stated: "President Nixon has directed that Secretary Rogers and I petition ICAO
to press for enforcement of the obligation of all countries to deny hijackers
sanctuary from prosecution or refuge from extradition." 67 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 357, 358 (Oct. 2, 1972). For a copy of the Draft Articles Prepared at
Subcommittee see 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 361-64 (Oct. 2, 1972). On
September 25, 1972, Secretary of State William Rogers addressed the United
Nations on the need for multilateral cooperation to quash air piracy. See 67
DEP'T STATE BULL. 425 (Oct. 16, 1972). Accordingly, President Nixon
established a cabinet committee to combat terrorism. One of the committee's
first orders of business was to suspend the regulation that permitted entry into the
United States without avisa. See 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 475 (Oct. 23, 1972). On
November 1, 1972, President Nixon signed the instrument of Ratification of the
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APPENDIX A
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Session de Zagreb
Aofit-Septembre 1971

September 2, 1971 (afternoon)
Eighteenth Commission
Hijacking of Aircraft
Rapporteur: M. McWhinney

Final Draft of Resolution
presented by the Rapporteur.
THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSIDERING that acts of seizure or unauthorized exercise of control of aircraft
in flight jeopardizing the life and health of passengers and crew, as well as of
persons on the ground or in other aircraft, in disregard of elementary
considerations of humanity, are unlawful under international law,

Montreal Sabotage Convention, which he had transmitted for Senate approval on
September 15. In transmitting a copy of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (signed at Montreal on
September 23, 1971), President Nixon explained that "[1]t requires States to
extradite offenders or prosecute them where they are found. It is designed to
ensure the prosecution of saboteurs and other terrorists who attack aircraft, and it
can help serve to quell this increasingly serious problem for civil aviation
worldwide." 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 418 (Oct. 9, 1972). On signing the
instrument of ratification by the United States, President Nixon pointed out that
ICAO has before it several additional proposals, including a draft convention
providing for the prosecution or extradition of persons who attack or kidnap
foreign officials, and a convention calling for the suspension of air service to
countries refusing to prosecute or extradite hijackers. See 67 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 607 (Nov. 20, 1972). Early in December, the United States, through the
Swiss Embassy in Cuba, began negotiating an agreement with Cuba covering
hijackings of both aircraft and ships. To date the negotiations have not produced
agreement on whether hijackers will be extradited, prosecuted, or both. Official
spokesmen indicated that a final agreement was expected before the end of 1972 or
shortly thereafter. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 6. Finally, the United
States has unilaterally taken the strongest measures to date to prevent hijackings
in this country. On December 5, 1972, Secretary Volpe ordered all airports
handling regularly scheduled flights to hire armed guards and to station them at
every boarding gate. All passengers are to be electronically inspected and all
carry-on luggage, including wrapped Christmas presents, is to be personally
inspected by airport personnel. This ruling is expected to affect some 531 airports
handling 15,000 flights daily, and will cost approximately 75 million dollars per
year. Secretary Volpe indicated that rate hikes would be justified to cover this
increased expense.
The stringency of this measure indicates the immediacy of the need for
stronger international cooperation to close the loopholes in the Hague Convention.
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CONSIDERING that such unlawful acts may endanger international peace and
friendly relations among States,
CONSIDERING that such unlawful acts jeopardize the freedom of international
communications and seriously affect the operations of air services and undermine
the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation,
HAVING REGARD to the general condemnation of such unlawful acts expressed
in the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of the
International Civil Aviation Organisation and of regional intergovernmental
organisations,
I
IS OF THE OPINION that no purpose or objective, whether political or other, can
constitute justification for such illegal acts; and that every State in whose territory
the authors of such acts may be found has the right and the obligation, if it does
not extradite such persons, to undertake criminal prosecution against them.
H
NOTES that, amongst others, the following rules of international law apply
(1.) Under the general rules of international air law, as expressed especially in the
Chicago Convention of 7 December 1944, States are required to ensure the safety,
regularity, and efficiency of international air navigation and to collaborate with
each other to this end.
(2.) Under the general rules of international law which find particular expression
in articles 25 and 37 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, States are required to
render assistance to aircraft in distress in their territory and to permit, subject to
control by their own authorities, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the
States in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of assistance as
may be necessitated by the circumstances.
(3.) Under general international law, States are required not to allow knowingly
their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.
EXPRESSES THE OPINION THAT, in consequence, States must take all
appropriate measures to give effect to these principles, notably by taking action:
a) to prevent the accomplishment of acts of unlawful diversion of aircraft in
flight,
b) and, in cases where an unlawfully diverted aircraft lands in their territory,
to restore control of the unlawfully diverted aircraft to its lawful
commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft,
- to permit the passengers and crew of the aircraft to continue their journey
as soon as practicable,
- to return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to
possession,
- to ensure the personal safety and human dignity of the passengers and crew
until their journey can be continued.
-
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III
NOTES that the concern of States to resolve the problem of unlawful diversion of
aircraft in flight has received a first recognition in the adoption of The Convention
on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at
Tokyo on 14 September 1963 and in The Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970,
CONSIDERS that, in ratifying these Conventions and in making all necessary
dispositions to give effect to them, States will contribute to implementing and to
rendering precise the obligations set out in this Resolution as well as contributing
to the progressive development of international law in these matters,
UNDERLINES, in particular, the urgency for States to make such adaptations in
their internal law as may be necessary to give effect to the principles contained in
the abovementioned Conventions.
IV
The preceding Resolutions do not prejudge in any way the question of the
prevention and repression of all other acts of violence capable of endangering the
safety of airtranspoxt; nor the question of a more specific regulation of sanctions
against States which fail to fulfill their international obligations in the matter of
the unlawful diversion of aircraft in flight.
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